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THE RELEVANCE OF PREMARITAL COHABITATION TO
PROPERTY DIVISION AWARDS IN DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS: AN EVALUATION OF PRESENT TRENDS
AND A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMt
BARBARA FREEDMAN WAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Changing societal values regarding the propriety and acceptability of non-
marital cohabitation have been reflected in the law. State officials often do
not enforce criminal statutes that prohibit fornication and adultery,1 and
several states have responded directly to changing mores by repealing such
statutes. 2 Similarly, in the area of family law, numerous courts have reexam-
ined traditional public policy rationales that proscribe the recognition of
mutual property rights between nonmarital cohabitants.3 These courts
t © 1983 by Barbara Freedman Wand.
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University; J.D., 1979, Indiana University.
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Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 441, 445 (1976); Weisberg,
Alternative Family Structures and the Law, 24 THE FAMILY COORDINATOR 549, 551
(1975).
2 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 269a-269b (West 1970) (adultery) (repealed
1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1551 (1964) (fornication) (repealed 1975); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632:2 (1974) (deviate sexual relations) (repealed 1975); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:110-1 (West 1969) (fornication) (repealed 1978); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 167.005, .015 (adultery, lewd cohabitation) (repealed 1971); Law of June 24, 1939,
No. 375, § 505, 1939 Pa. Laws 872, 906 (adultery) (repealed 1972).
3 See, e.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Kozlowski v. Koz-
lowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507
(1978); In re Estate of Steffes, 95 Wis. 2d 490, 290 N.W.2d 697 (1980); Kinnison v.
Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1981).
Some states still refuse to grant remedies to nonmarital cohabitants upon the
termination of their relationship. See, e.g., Roach v. Button, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2355 (Tenn. Ch. Feb. 29, 1980) (claim for equity relief for contributions made during
15-month cohabitation refused because plaintiff entered into a relationship "not
sanctioned by Natural or Divine law"); Boyles v. Boyles, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2379 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 1979) (female cohabitant's claims for support and property
award unenforceable because they contravene public policy disfavoring the grant of
mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants).
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realize that a lifestyle now so prevalent in our society4 cannot be ignored if
the law is to remain responsive to the needs of society. Guided by the
well-publicized Marvin case5 in California, many courts have revised their
positions with respect to the rights of nonmarital cohabitants upon the
termination of their relationship. 6
The change in sexual and social mores, which led to the rising popularity
of nonmarital cohabitation as an alternative to marriage, also has led to a
growing trend toward premarital cohabitation, i.e., nonmarital cohabitation
as a prelude to marriage. 7 Yet, the proliferation of both judicial opinions and
legal commentary defining the rights of nonmarital cohabitants" has not been
4 In the 10 year period between 1970 and 1980, the number of unrelated unmarried
heterosexual couples living together rose from 523,000 to 1,560,000, an increase of
approximately 200%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS SERIES P-20, No. 365,
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1980, at 5 (1981). These
statistics may include living arrangements outside the scope of the term "nonmarital
cohabitation," as that term is utilized in this Article, such as an elderly woman who
rents a room to a male college student. The 1980 statistics, however, indicate that
only 1% of unmarried-couple households had a person 65 years or older sharing living
quarters with an unrelated person under 35 who was of the opposite sex. Rather, 63%
of all unmarried couples involved two adults under the age of 35. Id. at 4.
5 Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
6 See cases cited supra note 3.
7 Some studies have shown that more cohabitants perceive the period of nonmari-
tal cohabitation as a trial period or prelude to marriage than as a chosen alternative to
marriage.
Cohabitation, as it seems to be practiced today by middle-class college stu-
dents, is defined as a replacement for marriage by only a small minority of the
participants. As ... others have concluded, cohabitation in most cases is a stage
in the courtship process. Cohabitants seem not to be rejecting marriage itself,
but merely adding to some of the processes by which the marriage bond is
formed.
Bower & Christopherson, University Student Cohabitation: A Regional Comparison
of Selected Attitudes and Behavior, 39 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
447, 450-51 (1977).
Although the above study may not be representative of all cohabitants in that it was
restricted to college students, a Swedish study involving a more randomly selected
sample also suggests that nonmarital cohabitation is utilized by many as a prelude to
marriage rather than as a deliberately chosen alternative. Of all the unmarried
cohabitants surveyed, about two thirds intended or believed that they would marry.
J. TROST, UNMARRIED COHABITATION 92 (1979). A group of newly married couples
who had lived together before marriage were asked why they did not marry in
connection with moving in together. Forty-six percent of the men and 57% of the
women answered that they either "wanted to try it first" or "didn't know each other
well enough." Id. at 81. Both responses suggest use of the period of cohabitation as a
trial period or prelude to marriage. See also infra note 113.
8 Accompanying the proliferation of judicial opinions redefining the property
rights to be accorded cohabitants, see supra note 3, was a great increase in the
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paralleled by a similar growth in either area with respect to the effect of
premarital cohabitation in dividing property at divorce. A period of premari-
tal cohabitation should influence not only which property is subject to
division upon divorce but also how that property ultimately is divided. Most
divorce courts faced with the dilemma of fashioning a remedy in such
situations, however, have not distinguished premarital cohabitation claims
from nonmarital cohabitation claims. 9 Consequently, divorce courts have
utilized a patchwork scheme for dealing with premarital cohabitation claims
that does not adequately address the distinct policy considerations
raised by such claims. This patchwork scheme leaves divorcing couples with
a cumbersome remedy ill-suited to an equitable solution to their problem, or
even worse, with no solution at all.
This Article will examine current judicial treatment of premarital cohabita-
tion in the context of two major types of property division statutes applicable
to divorce proceedings. After discussing several problems with the current
approach, the Article explores judicial and legislative alternatives. Although
the judicial alternative-recognition of the premarital cohabitation period
through broad interpretation of existing statutory language or through
number of law review articles evaluating current trends. See, e.g., Folberg & Buren,
Domestic Partnership: A Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families,
12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 453 (1976); Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the
Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1977); Comment, Property Rights upon Termination
of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708 (1977);
Comment, Marvin v. Marvin: Five Years Later, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 389 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Marquette Comment]; Comment, The Enforcement of Cohabi-
tation Agreements: Theories of Recovery for the Meretricious Spouse, 61 NEB. L.
REV. 138 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Nebraska Comment].
9 See, e.g., In re Goldstein, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (App. Ct. 1981)
(relying on nonmarital cohabitation cases to reject wife's claim that supporting her
husband during a period of premarital cohabitation should be considered in determin-
ing appropriate property settlement); In re Marriage of Crouch, 88 Ill. App. 3d 426,
410 N.E.2d 580 (App. Ct. 1980) (denying wife's claim to art objects acquired during a
period of premarital cohabitation because similar claims in palimony cases are
without remedy in Illinois); Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9 (Me. 1979) (stating
that real estate acquired during a period of premarital cohabitation cannot be
classified as marital property); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1982)
(relying on nonmarital cohabitation cases, and fact that palimony is not accepted in
Wyoming, to deny wife relief); cf. Hager v. Hager, 553 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1976)
(although court rejects a relation-back theory under which a period of premarital
cohabitation is relevant in determining property division awards pursuant to divorce,
it achieves the same result by looking at the manner of acquisition of the property);
Vine v. Vine, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2765 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 1981)
(considering the unmarried and married period of the parties' relationship "in order
to fairly determine the ultimate rights of the parties"); Jiminez v. Jiminez, 68 111. App.
3d 651, 386 N.E.2d 647 (App. Ct. 1979) (holding that Illinois statute, now repealed,
does not limit the court's power to distribute property acquired solely during the
marital period).
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transmutation-is preferable to current judicial treatment, this Article con-
cludes that legislation is needed. The legislative proposal, a modification of
existing state divorce statutes, directly responds to the special problems
encountered by the litigants, the courts, and the state when parties who have
lived together before marriage are divorced.
II. PROPERTY DIVISION AWARDS IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS: CURRENT
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PREMARITAL COHABITATION
A. Basing Recognition of Premarital Cohabitation on Nonmarital
Cohabitation Remedies
A divorce court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding'0 seeks to fashion
relief that will separate the lives of the divorcing spouses equitably and in a
manner designed to give both spouses the resources to lead an independent
life. Litigants in increasing numbers are petitioning divorce courts to give
10 The words "divorce" and "dissolution of marriage" are used interchangeably
in this Article. Some states, however, in conjunction with a revision of their divorce
statutes to encompass "no-fault" bases for divorce, also discarded the word "di-
vorce" as a term connoting the previous fault system. Instead, they substituted the
term "dissolution of marriage." See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 301 commissioners' notes (1979). When a court considers a petition for the dissolu-
tion of marriage, it also may be asked to determine property division, custody, child
support, and alimony.
SI Although theoretically speaking, alimony rather than property division is the
vehicle through which divorce courts provide for a spouse in need of support, in
practice, courts use both property division awards and alimony to furnish spouses
with sufficient resources to become independent. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS §§ 14.5, 14.8 (1968); Fain, The Effect of Property Distribution on
Alimony Awards in a Community Property Jurisdiction (California), in ECONOMICS
OF DIVORCE 35 (1978); Inker, Walsh & Perocchi, Alimony and Assignment of Prop-
erty: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts, in FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND
LOVERS: LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 237, 246-47 (1979); see also Gugliotta
v. Gugliotta, 160 N.J. Super. 160, 388 A.2d 1338 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (stating that
alimony serves (1) to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge; and (2) to
allow her to share in the accumulation of marital assets and in the economic rewards
made possible by her husband's income level, which was reached through their
combined efforts), aff'd, 164 N.J. Super. 139, 395 A.2d 901 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978).
Statutes themselves may muddle the distinction between the purposes of alimony
and property division. To illustrate, New York's property division statute provides
that courts should consider, inter alia, the income and property of each party at the
time of the marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action, the age and
health of both parties, any award of maintenance, and the probable future financial
circumstances of each party. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 pt. B(5)(d) (McKinney
Supp. 1981). Conversely, in determining the amount and duration of maintenance,
the statute directs courts to consider, inter alia, the income and property of the
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some recognition to the period of premarital cohabitation in fashioning such
relief, particularly in the context of property division awards.1 2 Although
state statutes circumscribe the courts' power to divide property by delineat-
ing which property may be divided and by providing guidelines for making
the actual property division, statutes often leave the judiciary with broad
discretionary powers to fashion the award.13 Nonetheless, courts are not
examining in depth the phenomenon of premarital cohabitation and its prop-
er relationship to property division remedies. Instead, courts assume that
any relief accorded to parties based upon the period of premarital cohabi-
tation must derive from and be governed by the rights of nonmarital cohabi-
tants.
Property division statutes in most states recognize two categories of
property-separate property and marital property-and limit the courts'
power of division to the latter category. 14 In states with this statutory
scheme, referred to in this Article as "separate/marital" property states,
parties, including that distributed pursuant to the property division award. Id. § 236
pt. B(6).
12 These requests for recognition are taking a variety of forms, including: (1) re-
quests that property acquired during premarital cohabitation be considered marital
property, In re Goldstein, 97 Il. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (App. Ct. 1981);
(2) requests that activities of a spouse during the period of premarital cohabitation be
considered in fashioning an alimony award, id. ; and (3) requests that claims regarding
property interests of one spouse in the property of the other spouse allegedly
acquired during premarital cohabitation be joined with the divorce action, Vine v.
Vine, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2765 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 1981).
13 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11 (Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208,
§ 34 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 pt. B(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1981).
14 Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia can be generally classified as
"separate/marital" property states as of September, 1982: Alabama, Alaska, Arkan-
sas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview as of September, 1982,
8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4065, 4079-83. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1982); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981).
Eight states and Puerto Rico follow the civil law institution of community property:
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washing-
ton. Freed & Foster, supra, at 4079. In community property states, property ac-
quired during the marriage through the efforts of the parties belongs to both spouses,
and upon divorce, the court is authorized to divide only the community property.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150
(1979); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1981). Thus for purposes of this
Article, these states are similar to those common law states authorizing division of
only marital property.
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marital property usually is defined as all property acquired by the parties
during the marriage, regardless of how title to that property is held."5 Sepa-
rate property generally includes property acquired by gift, bequest, devise,
descent, property excluded by valid agreement of the parties, and property
acquired before the marriage. 16
Although a few "separate/marital" property statutes give the court discre-
1- See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.54(5) (West Supp. 1982).
Straightforward as this definition may seem, questions do arise, even in cases not
involving premarital cohabitation, as to whether a particular piece of property was
acquired before or after the marriage. Jurisdictions have split, for example, on the
characterization of property when prior to the marriage one spouse takes title subject
to an outstanding mortgage, and during the marriage the mortgage balance is reduced
from marital funds. Some states subscribe to a title test which dictates that when title
to property is taken prior to marriage, the property is the separate property of the
titleholder despite the contribution of marital funds to reduce the indebtedness. See,
e.g., Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866, 870, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (use of marital
property to pay mortgage does not affect status of the farm as husband's separate
property; however, it is a relevant factor in dividing the marital property); Colden v.
Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 148, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943). Other states follow a
source-of-funds rule whereby the source of funds used to satisfy the indebtedness
and clear title determines the characterization of the property. If both marital and
nonmarital funds contributed to the equity in the property, courts may consider a
percentage of the property to be separate property and a percentage to be marital
property. See In re Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 491 (Ct.
App. 1972); Tibbets v. Tibbets, 406 A.2d 70, 75 (Me. 1979).
Another question that frequently arises involves the proper characterization of
appreciation of separate property. Although some statutes address this question
directly, see, e.g., Ill. Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, § 503(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982), other states rely on judicial interpreta-
tion to determine the proper characterization. See generally Krauskopf, Marital
Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 157 (1978).
These problems differ from the problems addressed by this Article in that the
proper characterization of property in the situations discussed above involves cir-
cumstances occurring during the marriage. In contrast, claims made by premarital
cohabitants involve circumstances arising prior to the marriage, a time period previ-
ously of virtually no significance to divorce courts in fashioning property division
awards.
16 Separate property-sometimes called "nonmarital property"--often is defined
in statutes only in terms of exceptions to the definition of marital property. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B) (Supp. 1981):
(B) For the purpose of this statute "marital property" means all property acquired
by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2) Property ac-
quired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (3) Property acquired by a
spouse after a decree of legal separation; (4) Property excluded by valid agree-
ment of the parties; and (5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to
the marriage.
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tion to invade one spouse's separate property for the benefit of the other
spouse when the balancing of equities so requires, 17 most provide that "the
court shall assign each spouse's nonmarital property to that spouse." '8 Even
in those states, however, a court could conceivably expand the definition of
divisible property to include property acquired during a period of premarital
cohabitation. Alternatively, by liberally interpreting existing statutory lan-
guage, a court might be able to consider the period of cohabitation as a factor
in deciding how to divide marital property. 19
In In re Goldstein, 20 a recent Illinois case, the trial court failed to con-
sider either alternative and excluded evidence that the wife in a divorce
action had supported her husband during a period of premarital cohabita-
tion while he was in medical school. The appellate court affirmed, citing
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 21 a prior Illinois case that denied recovery between unmar-
ried cohabitants because judicial recognition of mutual property rights be-
tween unmarried cohabitants would violate the policy of the Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act. 22 By relying on a case dealing with nonmarital
cohabitation, the Illinois court failed to consider that theories applicable to
the termination of a nonmarital relationship might not be appropriate to a
situation involving the dissolution of a marriage. 23
'7 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210(6) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.58 (West Supp. 1982).
18 I11. Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); accord ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
19 See infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
20 97 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (App. Ct. 1981). Mrs. Goldstein asked the
court first to characterize her husband's increased earning potential, derived from
his medical degree, as marital property, and second, to consider her husband's
capacity for increased earnings in determining an appropriate maintenance award.
The Illinois Appellate Court denied both requests.
21 77 Ill. 2d 49, 61-64, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-11 (1979).
22 Goldstein, 97 II1. App. 3d at 1028, 423 N.E.2d at 1205.
23 Several other courts have made similar errors in analysis. See In re Marriage of
Crouch, 88 11. App. 3d 426, 410 N.E.2d 580 (App. Ct. 1980); Grishman v. Grishman,
407 A.2d 9 (Me. 1979). In Crouch, Mrs. Crouch unsuccessfully claimed that art
objects acquired during a period of nonmarital cohabitation should be characterized
as marital property. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of
her claims:
Mrs. Crouch has predicated her claims against Mr. Crouch in the context of a
dissolution of marriage proceeding and has based her claims upon their pre-
marital cohabitation relationship. While we might acknowledge that she was both
a domestic associate and business associate of Mr. Crouch during their live-in
relationship, the arguments she has used are strikingly similar to those of the
so-called palimony cases. Our Supreme Court has expressly declined to sanction
such pre-marital property rights even when very persuasive arguments were
presented .... The heart of the petitioner's claims to the disputed property is
that she was in some form a partner in the art gallery business and in equity and
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In another group of states, referred to in this Article as "all property"
states, 24 the court has authority to divide all property owned by the parties
regardless of in whose name it is titled or when it was acquired. 25 Although
property acquired both prior to and during the marriage is subject to division
in "all property" states, the statutorily-prescribed factors that courts are
directed to consider in actually dividing the property do not deal adequately
with a divorce situation involving premarital cohabitation.
26
good conscience should be compensated for her work benefiting the business
prior to their marriage. Her plight, however compelling, has no available remedy
under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.
88 I11. App. 3d at 430-31, 410 N.E.2d. at 583.
In Grishman, the Supreme Court of Maine reversed a trial court's classification of
real estate acquired by a couple during a period of premarital cohabitation as marital
property. The court held the plain language of the state's definition of "marital
property" to be controlling.
24 There are 16 "all property" states: Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See Freed & Foster, supra note 14, at
4079-83. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-51 (West 1978); IND. CODE § 31-
1-11.5-11 (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 751 (Supp. 1982).
25 There is a third group of states, referred to in this Article as "title states," in
which only property held jointly by the parties may be divided. Mississippi and West
Virginia are the only states presently fitting squarely within this category. Freed &
Foster, supra note 14, at 4079. South Carolina also is a title state, but only-with
respect to real property. Personal property is distributed equitably. Id. In title states,
any property in which title is taken in the name of only one spouse remains the
property of that spouse; the court has no power to transfer that property to the other
spouse. See, e.g., Bond v. Bond, 355 So. 2d 672, 673 (Miss. 1978).
Doctrines of gift, constructive trust, and tracing of equitable title may mitigate the
harshness of the rule in title states. See Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709, 714
(W. Va. 1981) (although state divorce statute was restrictive regarding the transfer of
title, court permitted wife to join an equitable claim of constructive trust with the
divorce proceedings to achieve the same result). Three major exceptions to the
"title" rule in South Carolina also substantially liberalize the rule: (1) a resulting
trust is recognized when one spouse has title to the property but the nontitled spouse
paid a specific sum for it; (2) an equitable remedy is recognized when nontitled
spouse materially contributed to the acquisition of the property; and (3) an equitable
interest in property is recognized when a homemaker spouse sacrificed career oppor-
tunities to remain at home and rear children, Parrot v. Parrot, 292 S.E.2d 182 (S.C.
1982). See Freed & Foster, supra note 14, at 4079.
Absent judicial creativity, property acquired during a period of premarital cohabi-
tation is not divisible in "title" states unless held jointly by the parties.
26 See, e.g., Vine v. Vine, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2765 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29,
1981); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1982). In both of these cases, the
plaintiffs pursued their premarital cohabitation claims separately from their requests
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Problems arise, for example, when "all property" statutes direct the court
to consider who brought particular property into the marriage in deciding
who should be awarded the property. 27 Prior to the growth in premarital
cohabitation, it was relatively simple to determine who brought a particular
piece of property into the marriage; couples generally did not unite their
economic lives until the date of their marriage. 28 Today, however, parties
who precede their marriage by a period of cohabitation may have functioned
as an economic unit in much the same way as if they were married; the
parties may have acquired a considerable amount of property during this
premarital period. In such cases, it may not be clear whether only one party
brought a particular piece of property into the marriage or whether both
parties have some claim to the property. Courts may not be willing, how-
ever, to take into account the fact that the parties acquired the property
during a period of premarital cohabitation. Rather, they may view the
statutory reference to "who brought the property into the marriage" as an
indication of legislative intent that events occurring prior to the marriage not
be considered.
Thus, instead of dealing directly with the particular problems of divorcing
parties who have lived together before marriage, courts have premised the
recognition of the premarital period in a divorce proceeding upon the exis-
tence of remedies to nonmarital cohabitants. By placing all persons who
cohabit without benefit of marriage into a single category, courts have not
acknowledged the potential differentiating factor of the marriage itself.
Rather, they have treated parties who have lived together uniformly,
whether or not their cohabitation resulted in marriage. Courts have assumed
that both the form and availability of relief to nonmarital cohabitants should
be determinative of that available to premarital cohabitants upon the dissolu-
tion of marriage.
B. Remedies Available to Nonmarital Cohabitants
Many of the problems involved in relegating divorcing parties to the
remedies available to nonmarital cohabitants derive from the nature of those
remedies. Therefore, an understanding of those remedies is necessary to an
appreciation of the problems that arise. Because of a long-standing policy
for property division pursuant to the dissolution, indicating uncertainty on the part of
these litigants as to whether the dissolution statute itself could serve as the basis of
relief.
27 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11(b)(2) (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(1)(b) (West 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751(b)(10) (Supp. 1982).
28 Although there are certain problems with respect to the proper characterization
of property as separate or marital, see supra note 15, those problems generally
revolve around the effect of circumstances occurring during the marriage. Prior to the
growth in premarital cohabitation, however, if the property was purchased com-
pletely before marriage, few questions were raised regarding the characterization of
the property itself, although questions regarding the proper characterization of ap-
preciation of property may have existed.
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encouraging marriage, states have been reluctant to accord nonmarital
cohabitants the same status as married individuals by granting them relief
under their respective marriage and divorce laws. Instead, most states have
based remedies available to nonmarital cohabitants on contractual or
intent-based theories, or alternatively, on fairness theories. 29
1. Intent-Based Theories
A growing number of jurisdictions are enforcing express contracts by
nonmarital cohabitants that set forth their intentions with respect to their
economic relationship during or at the termination of their relationship.3 0
The major bar to enforcing such agreements in the past was the general rule
that agreements based upon illegal consideration are unenforceable. 31
Courts assumed that part of the consideration for agreements between
nonmarital cohabitants was the provision of sexual services, an illegal form
of consideration that barred the enforceability of the agreement.
32
Some courts still rely on the doctrine of illegal consideration to bar
enforcement of contracts between nonmarital cohabitants .3 3 However, many
courts either have rejected the doctrine as applied to nonmarital cohabi-
tants 34 or have utilized other legal doctrines such as severability3 5 to strike
down the part of the contract supported by illegal consideration while leaving
the remainder of the contract intact and enforceable. 36
29 See generally Marquette Comment, supra note 8; Nebraska Comment, supra
note 8.
30 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 219, 354 P.2d 260, 263 (1960);
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 674, 557 P.2d 106, 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825
(1976); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 573-74, 205 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Ct.
App. 1973); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 385-88, 403 A.2d 902, 906-08
(1979); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 421-27, 547 P.2d 144, 144-47 (1976).
1' 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1373-75 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 178 (1981); 15 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1745 (3d ed. 1972).
32 See Freed & Foster, supra note 14, at 4099.
33 See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 543, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1977); Roach v.
Buttons, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2355, 2355 (Tenn. Ch. Feb. 29, 1980).
34 See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602, 602-04 (Alaska 1980) (court implicitly
rejected the doctrine by holding that jury could reasonably have found mutual assent
and consideration to support a contractual obligation between the parties, who had
cohabited for 20 years); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 123, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (1978) (court
implicitly rejected doctrine by holding that property of man and woman living
together in a nonmarital relationship should be distributed according to the express or
implied intent of the parties).
3- Under the doctrine of severability, the court severs the part of the contract
supported by illegal consideration, leaving the balance of the contract enforceable.
See 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 31, § 1476; 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note 31, §§ 1752,
1782.
36 See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 672, 557 P.2d 106, 114, 134 Cal.
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Most cases dealing with the enforceability of express contracts between
nonmarital cohabitants involve allegations of an oral contract rather than a
formal written contract. 37 Accordingly, evidentiary problems often arise
regarding the existence of such an agreement. In addition, questions regard-
ing the actual terms of such contracts are prevalent because the oral con-
tracts themselves often do not represent a comprehensive, considered at-
tempt at negotiation by the parties. Instead, they consist of one-sentence
representations exhibiting an intent to share property acquired during the
period of cohabitation, such as "what is mine is yours. ' 38
If an express contract cannot be shown, nonmarital cohabitants may seek
relief under an implied-in-fact contract. 39 In considering the appropriateness
of recovery under this theory, the court examines the conduct of the parties
during their cohabitation to determine whether that conduct represents an
implied agreement between the parties with respect to their economic rela-
tionship. 40 Courts consider the way in which household finances were han-
dled, 41 the existence of joint bank accounts, 42 the provision by one party and
Rptr. 815, 823 (1976); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 573, 205 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Ct. App. 1973);
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 385, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (1979).
37 See, e.g., Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980);
Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 570-77, 205 N.W.2d 595, 595-99 (Ct. App.
1973); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 384, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (1979); Morone
v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 487, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156-57, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595
(1980); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595-96 (Wyo. 1981).
If the action alleges an oral agreement to convey real property or an oral agreement
regarding lifelong companionship and services, the Statute of Frauds may bar recov-
ery. See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Kleven, 261 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1958); Wilke v. Olden-
burg, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2086 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 78 A.D.2d 808, 434 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 1980). Several states have
proposed legislation specifically requiring contracts between nonmarital cohabitants
to be in writing. See Freed & Foster, supra note 14, at 4103 (listing recent proposals).
However, mitigating doctrines sometimes may remove the agreement from the
constraints of the Statute of Frauds or these state statutes. See, e.g., Jiminez v.
Jiminez, 68 Ill. App. 3d 651, 386 N.E. 647 (App. Ct. 1979) (full performance removes
agreement from Statute of Frauds); Muller v. Sobol, 277 A.D. 884, 97 N.Y.S.2d 905
(App. Div. 1950) (enforcing agreements with respect to real property, despite the lack
of a writing, in order to prevent unjust enrichment).
38 Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
39 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 18 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 5 (1981); 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3 (3d ed.
1979).
40 See, e.g., In re Estate of Donley, 3 Mich. App. 458, 461-62, 142 N.W.2d 898,
900 (Ct. App. 1966); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Minn. 1977); In re
Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 80, 499 P.2d 864, 868 (1972); In re Estate of
Steffes, 95 Wis. 2d 490, 505, 290 N.W.2d 697, 704 (1980).
41 See, e.g., McCullon v. McCullon, 96 Misc. 2d 962, 973, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226, 233
(Sup. Ct. 1978).
42 Id.
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acceptance by the other of household services, 43 and the manner in which
title was taken to certain property acquired during the relationship. 44
Another possible intent-based theory of recovery for nonmarital cohabi-
tants is resulting trust, an equitable theory of recovery similar to implied-in-
fact contract in that the intention of the parties is ascertained from cir-
cumstantial evidence. In order to justify the imposition of a resulting trust on
property, the court must find: (1) that one party purchased property with
consideration furnished entirely or in part by another party;45 and (2) that
the circumstances surrounding the purchase demonstrate an intent that the
titleholder hold the property or an interest in the property in trust for the
party providing the consideration.4 6 This remedy is usually narrower than
those previously mentioned because it focuses on the intent of the parties
with respect to a particular piece of property rather than with respect to their
entire economic relationship.
43 See, e.g., In re Estate of Donley, 3 Mich. App. 458, 461, 142 N.W.2d 898, 899
(Ct. App. 1966).
44 See, e.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Minn. 1977).
41 See, e.g., Albae v. Harbin, 249 Ala. 201, 202-03, 30 So. 2d 459, 460 (1947);
Padilla v. Padilla, 38 Cal. App. 2d 319, 319-21, 100 P.2d 1093, 1093-94 (Dist. Ct. App.
1940); Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 812, 232 P.2d 827, 829 (1951).
46 See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 74
(5th ed. 1973). The doctrine of resulting trust usually leads to a presumption that the
payor intended the grantee to be only a trustee for the payor. This presumption can
be rebutted by proof that the payor intended a gift to the grantee or it can be
confirmed by evidence that the parties expressly agreed that the payor should have
an equitable interest in the property. Id.
However, a presumption arises that the conveyance was a gift, and that the
titleholder-the grantee-is the beneficial owner, when the grantee is the husband or
parent of the payor or natural object of the payor's bounty, or when the payor and
grantee are nonmarital cohabitants. In all these instances, the burden of demonstrat-
ing a resulting trust is on the payor. Id. See Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808,
812-13, 232 P.2d 827, 829-30 (1951).
At least one court has suggested that a resulting trust theory might be used in a
premarital cohabitation claim as well. In Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9 (Me.
1979), the Supreme Court of Maine stated in a footnote that its decision left "the way
clear for the presiding justice to determine upon the evidence before him whether or
not [the property] was impressed with a resulting trust for the benefit of the wife." Id.
at 12 n.7. At issue in this divorce proceeding was the disposition of land, one half
interest of which was bought by the man prior to cohabiting and the other half bought
with money from a joint checking account during a period of premarital cohabitation.
The Supreme Court of Maine did not explore any of the potential problems involved
in dealing with a resulting trust theory when it is not raised by the parties, nor did it
discuss the problems of an independent claim in the context of a divorce action, see
infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
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2. Fairness Theories
The remedies discussed above all turn upon the intention of the parties,
either expressed in words or inferred from their conduct. Quasi-contractual
remedies, by contrast, focus not on intent, but on an evaluation of the
circumstances from the viewpoint of justice and fairness. If the facts demon-
strate that one party has been enriched to the detriment of another, the law
may imply a contract to rectify the perceived unjust enrichment. 47
The availability of a remedy based on quasi-contract, although not depen-
dent upon the intentions of both parties, may to a certain extent be contin-
gent upon whether the provider of benefits expected compensation.4 8 In a
nonmarital cohabitation situation, one party may provide homemaker ser-
vices on an extended basis to the other party, leaving the recipient free to
commit resources to the acquisition of property. Absent evidence to the
contrary, the court may imply an expectation of compensation, and conse-
quently, a contract to compensate the homemaker for his or her services. 49
The equitable remedy of constructive trust, like the quasi-contractual
remedy, is concerned not with the intention of the parties, but with rectifying
a situation involving the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of
another.5 0 If one nonmarital cohabitant acquired property through the con-
tribution of either services or funds of the other cohabitant, the law may
impose a constructive trust whereby the former holds the property in trust
for the contributor. 5' Again, the contributor's expectations in providing the
benefit are relevant to whether the enrichment involved was unjust.12
47 J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 1-12 (2d ed. 1977); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
48 See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 15-28, 39-43, 56-58 (1937)
(discussing appropriate and inappropriate circumstances for restitution, many of
which depend upon the intent and expectations of the person providing the benefit).
49 See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Edgar v.
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Doyle v. Giddley, 3 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2730
(Dane County Ct. Wis. Oct. 4, 1977).
50 G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 46, § 77, at 287; RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
1' See, e.g., Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (Ct. App. 1974). In
Omer, the plaintiff and defendant were divorced at the suggestion of the defendant,
who represented to plaintiff that the change in marital status would aid them in
obtaining United States citizenship. The couple cohabited for 10 years following their
divorce, and the plaintiff's earnings were used in part to purchase real property, title
to which was taken in defendant's name. The Court of Appeals of Washington
affirmed the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust, pointing to the defend-
ant's initiation of the divorce as a factor making his retention of the property "grossly
inequitable." Id. at 393, 523 P.2d at 961. Although either fraud, misrepresentation, or
overreaching is traditionally necessary to recovery under a constructive trust theory,
the Washington court in Omer did not require such a finding. It based its decision
upon the "clear element of unconscionability inherent in the findings of the trial court
which, in our view, justifies application of the doctrine of constructive trust." Id.
52 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PREMARITAL
COHABITATION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
A. Intent-Based Theories
The assumption of divorce courts that present theories provide an ade-
quate remedy to divorcing spouses who have engaged in a period of premari-
tal cohabitation fails to consider the effects of the intervening marriage on
the ability of spouses to prove the necessary elements of the cause of action.
Central to the success of a complaint alleging express contract, implied-in-
fact contract, or resulting trust is proof of the intention of the parties at the
time the agreement was made. 53 When nonmarital cohabitants utilize these
theories at the termination of their relationship, evidence of intent is often
fresh in the minds of the parties and others who might be called to testify.5 4
However, if the nonmarital period has been followed by marriage, the time
period from which the evidence supporting the claim must be gathered may
be far-removed from the time of the litigation, and the problems of proof thus
would multiply.
The intervening marriage poses yet another problem to the likelihood of
recovery under any theory that depends on the intentions of the parties.
Unless the parties entered into the period of cohabitation with the firm
intention of later marrying, an agreement by the parties may be framed solely
in terms of their property rights should the nonmarital relationship termi-
nate. An express agreement may not deal specifically with the effect of
marriage on property rights that accrued during the nonmarital relationship;
the terms of such an agreement, therefore, may not be operative where
marriage rather than termination of the relationship occurred.
The doctrine of waiver also may limit recovery under contract theories.
Waiver has been defined as "the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a
known right." 55 Because the marital relationship is accompanied by a highly
regulated statutory scheme regarding property rights, marriage may have an
effect on any property rights that accrued during the period of premarital
cohabitation. A court may find that parties who marry without seeking
clarification of their property rights have waived any rights which accrued
during that premarital period.5 6
51 See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
-4 Intent may be difficult to ascertain even when the action is brought immediately
upon termination of the nonmarital relationship, because cases frequently involve
only informal words of assurance or inferences from the conduct of the parties. See
supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The difficulty of proving intent may
increase in proportion to the length of the nonmarital relationship: in addition to the
problem of fading memories, the intent of the parties may change over time and,
therefore, the court may have to decide which period is most relevant.
-1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
56 This is particularly true in "separate/marital" property division states, which
dictate that the property a spouse brings into the marriage be assigned to that spouse
upon divorce. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, modification of contract and superseding contract doctrines
may impede the enforceability of cohabitation contracts by parties who
have married. Marriage itself is frequently characterized as a contract 7 and
consequently, may affect the enforceability of a prior premarital contract.
Both contracts have as part of their subject matter the regulation of the
economic relationship between the parties. If the marriage contract has
provisions that contradict the premarital contract with respect to allocation
of certain property upon termination of the relationship, the court might find
that the more recent contract, the marriage contract, either modified 8 or
superseded 9 the premarital contract. The application of either of these
doctrines would substantially affect the success of claims based on alleged
premarital contracts .
6 0
B. Fairness Theories
Problems also arise in applying fairness theories to premarital cohabitation
claims. When a period of nonmarital cohabitation is followed by marriage,
57 "Marriage is a personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out of
a civil contract to which consent of the parties is essential." UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT § 201 (1970). The marriage contract, however, is not solely a
private matter. State regulation limits the freedom of the parties to dictate the terms
of that contract and interjects the state as a party to the contract; states regulate the
requirements for entering into marriage and the rights and duties of the parties both
during marriage and at its dissolution. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386
(1978); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888). See generally Weitzman, Legal
Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974). For a
proposal to increase the freedom of parties to contract with respect to marriage, see
Note, Marriage as Contract: Towards a Functional Redefinition of the Marital
Status, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 607 (1973).
58 The parties may make oral modifications to a contract except as otherwise
provided by statute. 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 31, § 1294, at 201-02. "Further,
innumerable cases show that the fact that a contract has been put into express words
does not prevent the meaning and legal operation of those words from being affected
by a process of 'implication' from the conduct of the parties and from surrounding
circumstances." 3 id. § 564, at 293-95. Thus, the act of marrying with knowledge,
either actual or imputed, of the property division schemes upon divorce, might be
held to be an implied modification of a premarital contract.
59 "An existing claim can be instantly discharged by the subsitution of a new
executory agreement in its place." 6 id. § 1293, at 185. The subsitution can take
place either before or after the prior claim has matured. Id. at 186. As with modifica-
tion, a substituted contract may be implied from the conduct of the parties. Id. at 197.
60 The extent to which a court would hold that the marriage contract modified or
superseded the premarital contract would depend upon the terms and breadth of the
premarital contract. If the terms of the premarital contract were held to be consistent
with the terms of the marriage contract, those terms would remain in force. Thus, if
the premarital contract dealt with matters other than division of property or support,
those terms would remain enforceable.
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with its statutory imposition of property and support rights, a court might
find that the contributor's expectations of compensation are fulfilled by the
statutory rights obtained in conjunction with marriage, or alternatively, by
the very marriage itself. Furthermore, to the extent that recovery under
these theories is based on "fairness and justice" concerns, a court might
hold that the need for court intervention in the context of a divorce action is
not as compelling as it is in nonmarital cohabitation proceedings. 61 The
nonmarital cohabitant would be left with no remuneration absent judicial
intervention. By contrast, a premarital cohabitant who later marries is eligi-
ble to receive alimony or a property division award pursuant to the divorce
action regardless of judicial recognition of the premarital period. 62 Thus, the
marriage arguably can be considered to negate any prior inequity resulting
from the couple's premarital relationship.
C. Treating Premarital Cohabitation as a Separate Action
The courts' suggestion that spouses seeking recognition of the premarital
period in a divorce proceeding utilize remedies devised for nonmarital
cohabitants does not sufficiently consider the procedural problems arising
from that suggestion. Several problems may arise in joining the cohabitation
action and the divorce action in the same court. Some domestic relations
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that may not have the power to hear
contractual claims or claims for general equitable relief not tied to the
divorce claim. 63 Even if jurisdiction does exist, a party may prefer a jury
61 In Latham v. Hennessey, 13 Wash. App. 518, 535 P.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1975),
aff'd, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976), a husband filed a creditor's claim
against the estate of his deceased wife claiming either a partnership interest or a
community property interest in certain property acquired during a period of premari-
tal cohabitation. In affirming the trial court's denial of the claim, the Court of Appeals
of Washingtion emphasized that the husband would be provided for through a
bequest in his wife's will:
Moreover, the use of exceptions to avoid the "harshness" of the Creasman rule
suggests the influence of equitable considerations which are not present here
.... The record establishes that appellant is assured of a one-half interest of the
property in question by operation of the decedent's will. There was no error.
Id. at 524, 535 P.2d at 842.
62 Of course, practically speaking, if little or no divisible property exists, the need
for equitable intervention of the court remains as compelling as in nonmarital cohabi-
tation proceedings.
63 See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. § 1212 (neither party may assert any cause of action or
claim for relief other than as provided in rules of court or Family Law Act); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1504(a) (1981) (family court has jurisdiction over all actions for
divorce and annulment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.64, subd. 2 (West Supp. 1982)
(family court shall hear and determine all matters involving divorce, annulment or
legal separation); cf. Banks v. Banks, 22 Del. (6 Penne.) 442, 444-46, 67 A. 853, 854
(1907) (denying defendant's request to file a crossbill in divorce proceedings because
not within the jurisdicion granted by 1907 divorce statute).
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trial on the nonmarital cohabitation claim; however, the state statute may
not provide for jury trials in the domestic relations court. 64 Finally, the
joinder of claims provision in some states might prevent joinder of the
nonmarital claim with the divorce claim unless the court determines that
both claims arise from one transaction.
65
These problems may force the parties to try the nonmarital cohabitation
claim and the divorce action in two separate courts as two separate actions.
In addition to thwarting judicial economy concerns, this would increase
litigation expenses and thus deplete the economic resources available for
distribution as spousal or child support. 66
64 See, e.g., Steiwer v. Steiwer, 112 Or. 485, 492-95, 230 P. 359, 361- (1924)
(legislature has full control over form of divorce proceedings); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.010(1) (Supp. 1982) (trial by jury dispensed with for actions under
Washington's Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act). For a discussion as to how these
considerations may influence a nonmarital cohabitant in framing a complaint, see
Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of
Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 128-29 (1976).
65 In Vine v. Vine, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2765 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 1981),
a wife responded to her husband's complaint for dissolution of marriage with a cross
complaint, one count of which alleged that during a 14-year period of premarital
cohabitation, her husband expressly and impliedly agreed to share with her the
income and assets he acquired during that period. The husband moved to strike that
count claiming that it was not the proper subject of a dissolution of marriage action
and that it was not properly joined under a Connecticut statute limiting joinder of
claims to those claims "arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected
with the same subject of action." Id. at 2765. The Connecticut Superior Court
permitted joinder of the claims, finding "the unmarried period of the parties' relation-
ship and the married period of the marriage to be one transaction." Id.
The court's opinion does not explain clearly how the joinder will affect its delibera-
tions. The plain language of the holding implies that, although both the divorce and
nonmarital claims will be considered together in one action, they will be based upon
different theories. The court later states, however, that "the total time of [the
couple's] relationship should be considered in order to fairly determine the ultimate
rights of the parties that may have accrued over their entire time together." Id. at
2766. This statement appears to foresee a single determination of the couple's rights
vis-?t-vis one another. The Court's confusion may be indicative of its recognition that
a single determination rather than two separate actions will better reflect the realities
of the relationship and will better serve the goals of the divorce court.
66 Both statutes and case law recognize that a major task of divorce courts is to
provide for a distribution of resources by which the divorced spouses can function as
independent individuals. See, e.g., Ill. Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 102 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (The underlying purposes of the
Illinois Dissolution of Marriage Act include: "(4) mitigat[ing] the potential harm to
the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage;
[and] (5) mak[ing] reasonable provision for spouses and minor children during and
after litigation."); In re Marriage of Lee, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 1133, 398 N.E.2d 126,
133 (App. Ct. 1979) (goal of courts in dividing property is to leave parties in indepen-
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Another problem arising from the necessity of litigating the nonmarital
claim separately from the divorce action is that of delay in the resolution of
the divorce proceeding. Because the nonmarital claim involves clarification
of the title of property held at the beginning of the marriage, divorce courts in
states requiring knowledge of who brought property to the marriage67 must
await decision on the nonmaritial claim before fashioning a division of
property award. The alimony award also may be contingent upon the final
outcome of the nonmarital cohabitation claim. In determining the entitle-
ment to, and the amount and duration of alimony, many states consider the
financial circumstances of the parties at the time of the divorce, including the
amount and nature of property awarded to each spouse. 68 Moreover, many
jurisdictions do not allow a divorce court to dissolve a marriage until deci-
sions involving property division, support, or child custody have been re-
solved .69 Accordingly, the actual dissolution of marriage would, of necessity,
be postponed until a final decision was rendered on the nonmarital claim. 70
This delay is contrary to the policy of encouraging prompt resolution of
marital status to allow parties to proceed with their lives. 7 1
In addition to procedural problems, conceptual and practical problems
arise in fashioning an appropriate remedy when a nonmarital action is
brought after an intervening marriage. Because the claimant in an ordinary
nonmarital cohabitation case can pursue a claim immediately upon termina-
tion of the relationship, the property acquired during the nonmarital rela-
tionship frequently still exists. The court can issue a temporary restraining
order prohibiting the other cohabitant from disposing of the property pen-
dent position). To the extent that protracted and complicated litigation will deplete
the resources of the couple, these goals will be frustrated.
67 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236 pt. B(5)(d), 236 pt. B(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1981). For a general discussion of alimony, see supra note 11.
69 See, e.g., Leeds v. Leeds, 114 Misc. 2d 555, 557, 452 N.Y.S. 2d 271, 272-73
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Little v. Little, 96 Wash. 2d 183, 194-96, 634 P.2d 498, 504-06
(1981).
Illinois, by contrast, recently amended its Marriage & Dissolution of Marriage Act
to allow bifurcated judgments. Il. Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 401(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). Case law under the prior act
had allowed bifurcated judgments only under "appropriate circumstances," such as
when the court lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parties. In re Marriage of
Cohn, 94 111. App. 3d 732, 736-38, 419 N.E.2d 729, 732-34 (App. Ct. 1981) (superseded
by statute as stated in In re Marriage of Davies, 105 I11. App. 3d 661, 434 N.E.2d 357
(App. Ct. 1982)).
70 The period of delay could include a lengthy period of appeal in addition to the
delay caused by the trial in the nonmarital action.
7' "Certainly a desirable objective of domestic litigation is prompt and equitable
resolution of marital difficulties rather than their bitter prolongation." In re Marriage
of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 71 (Ct. App. 1974).
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dente lite.72 When the period of nonmarital cohabitation is followed by a
period of marriage, however, it is much more likely that at least some of the
property owned at the termination of the nonmarital relationship will have
been disposed of or exchanged for other property. The mere fact that the
exchange occurred during marriage does not necessarily transform the ex-
changed property into marital property. 7 3 Therefore, asserting a premarital
cohabitation claim might involve difficult problems of tracing the proceeds
from the disposition of property acquired during the premarital period. 74
D. Policy Implications: Premarital Cohabitation as Distinct From
Nonmarital Cohabitation
The problems that may confront a spouse seeking judicial recognition of a
period of premarital cohabitation in a divorce proceeding suggest that it may
be more difficult for spouses to obtain recovery at the time of divorce than it
is for persons who bring an action upon the termination of a strictly nonmari-
tal relationship. It is not consonant with public policy to penalize those who
have attempted to comport with societal norms through marriage by relegat-
ing them to remedies that will make it more difficult for them to recover than
if they had never married.
Furthermore, the availability and form of relief to premarital cohabitants
at the dissolution of marriage should not be based on that available to
nonmarital cohabitants. Dissolving a marriage and terminating a nonmarital
relationship implicate different policy considerations. In a dissolution of
marriage, the court is engaged in fashioning relief designed by law to sepa-
rate the lives of the divorcing spouses in an equitable manner, giving both
72 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-7(b)(1) (Burns Supp. 1982) ("[E]ither
party may request the court to issue a temporary restraining order... [riestraining
any person from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any way disposing of
any property except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life.").
73 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(B)(2) (Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1513(b)(1) (1981) (property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to
the marriage not marital property); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 581.54, subd. 5(c) (West
Supp. 1982) (similar statute).
74 Most reported cases involving requests for recognition of the premarital period
in divorce proceedings revolve around property acquired during the premarital period
that is still in existence at the time of the divorce action. However, claims have been
brought for recognition of premarital property interests framed in more general
terms. E.g., Vine v. Vine, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2765 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 29,
1981) (wife alleged husband expressly and impliedly agreed to share with her the
income and assets acquired by him during a 14-year premarital cohabitation period).
In such cases, if the property acquired during premarital cohabitation has been sold,
the court would not only have to trace the proceeds of the sale to determine how they
were used during the marriage, it would also have to determine whether the property
acquired from the proceeds was separate or marital and the interest of each party in
that property.
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spouses the resources to lead an independent life. 75 Although courts consid-
ering claims for relief at the termination of a nonmarital relationship may
have similar concerns, it is often difficult for them to separate the question of
whether relief is appropriate in a particular situation from the broader
question of the morality of nonmarital relationships. Because recognition of
the premarital period in the context of divorce does not directly involve
granting property rights to nonmarital cohabitants, it can be justified as an
appropriate tool to better accomplish the recognized goals of the court in a
divorce proceeding. Such recognition does not amount to an independent
determination of the propriety of relief to all nonmarital cohabitants.
Courts have relied on the differentiating factor of marriage to award relief
that might not otherwise have been available in a number of other contexts.
For example, in Burgess Construction Co. v. Lindley, 76 a woman sought
workmen's compensation benefits upon the death of the man with whom she
was cohabiting. The Supreme Court of Alaska awarded her the benefits as a
"surviving wife" under the Alaskan workmen's compensation statute de-
spite the fact that she and the deceased had been divorced and that the
deceased had subsequently been married and divorced two times prior to
cohabiting with her again. 77 By defining the claimant's eligibility in terms of
her prior marriage to the deceased, the court limited the availability of
benefits to cohabitants who had previously been married to each other. This
limitation has both economic appeal and appeal to those who would be
offended by the extension of such remedies to all nonmarital cohabitants.
In Glasgo v. Glasgo ,78 the fact that two nonmarital cohabitants previously
were married to each other also appears to have been a significant factor in
the Indiana Court of Appeals decision. In affirming the award of contractual
and equitable relief to the female claimant, the court carefully limited its
holding to the "unique circumstances" of the case:
We believe that it ill behooves courts to categorize . . . the Glasgos'
relationship ... as "meretricious" or "illicit" in any sense of those
terms .... There are still situations to which such terms apply, but this
case is not one of them. Here the specific facts which might give rise to a
description of meretricious relationship are conspicuously absent: the
parties had been married formerly, they sought to raise their children in
a family setting, they conducted themselves for a significant period of
time as a conventional American family . . .79
7- See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
76 504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972).
77 Id. Justice Erwin, author of the concurring opinion, found the majority's holding
to be in clear contradiction of a plain reading of the statute. Id. at 1025-26. He upheld
the benefits to the claimant as a common law wife. It is unclear from the facts in the
opinion, however, whether the claimant would have satisfied all the requirements for
a common law marriage. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 47
(West 1968).
78 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
79 Id. at 1330 (emphasis added).
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In both of these examples, the courts emphasized the parties' marriage in
granting relief, even though the cohabitation period followed dissolution of
the marriage.8 0 Stronger reasons exist for giving substantial weight to the
fact of the marriage in awarding relief when the period of cohabitation occurs
before the marriage, even if the jurisdiction does not grant relief to nonmari-
tal cohabitants. The parties in the latter situation progressed from the pre-
marital relationship, not recognized by law, to the legally recognized institu-
tion of marriage. This progression is more consonant with societal expecta-
tions and preferences than the progression in cases where the legally recog-
nized union was dissolved and followed by cohabitation. Parties who cohabit
after divorce move in the "wrong" direction; yet the law affords those
parties the benefits of the prior marriage. Certainly, the law should accord
similar benefits when the marriage follows the period of cohabitation.
IV. JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES FOR RECOGNITION OF THE PREMARITAL
PERIOD
The substantive and procedural problems that arise. when nonmarital
cohabitation remedies are used in the context of divorce proceedings, as well
as underlying policy concerns, make clear the need for alternative methods
of recognizing the premarital period upon the divorce of the parties.
A. Interpretation of Existing Language in Property Division Statutes
One possible method of recognizing the premarital period in the context of
divorce proceedings is through broader judicial interpretation of the existing
provisions of property division statutes. Judicial intrepretation may be
utilized both as a means of characterizing property acquired during premari-
tal cohabitation as divisible property, and as a means of considering the
period of premarital cohabitation in making the actual division of property."'
80 See also Parkinson v. J. & S. Tool Co., 64 N.J. 159, 313 A.2d 609 (1974), a case
in which a woman was awarded workman's compensation benefits as a de facto wife.
She had been previously married to the decedent and had been cohabiting with him at
the time of his death. The Supreme Court of New Jersey said that "petitioner's and
decedent's cohabitation from 1950 to the date of decedent's dath in 1968 had its
'genesis' in the ceremonial marriage of 1927." Id. at 166, 313 A.2d at 613. A private
renewal of marriage vows on the advice of a priest was held to "revive" the marriage
sufficiently to entitle the claimant to benefits as a de facto wife. Id., 313 A.2d at 613.
81 This latter approach is appropriate for all three types of property division
statutes although in "title" states judicial expansion options are considerably more
limited. Because courts in such states are limited to ascertaining and reaffirming title,
as opposed to "equitably" distributing property regardless of title, there is less room
to consider factors such as premarital cohabitation, which may be relevant to an
"equitable" solution. To the extent, however, that title states modify the harshness of
their scheme through concepts of special equity, see supra note 25, the suggestions
that follow also may be utilized in "title" states as judicial modifications of the
method for ascertaining title.
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In Illinois, for example, the property division statute directs the divorce
court to consider "all relevant factors, including . .. the contribution or
dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or depreciation or
appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property," when mak-
ing a property division award.8 2 Although this provision is used most fre-
quently by a spouse who has contributed to the other spouse's nonmarital
property during marriage, nothing in the language of the statute should
preclude a spouse from seeking recognition of contributions made to the
property of the other spouse prior to the marriage. Thus, when a party has
contributed to the acquisition of property during premarital cohabitation, but
title to that property is taken solely in the name of the other party, the Illinois
provision arguably requires the divorce court to consider the premarital
contribution in dividing the marital property. By considering this contribu-
tion, the premarital contributor would be awarded a greater proportion of the
marital property than would otherwise be the case.
Property division statutes in several states direct the divorce court to
consider "all relevant factors" in making a property division award.8 3 A
spouse in these states could argue that the fact that the parties lived together
before marriage and acquired property during that period through their joint
efforts should be taken into account in fashioning an appropriate property
division award.
Neither the Illinois statute nor the "all relevant factors" provision permits
characterization of property acquired during the premarital period as divisi-
ble. Both merely allow the premarital period to be considered when the court
divides the marital property. Therefore, the impact of such a provision under
a "separate/marital" property division statute may be minimal if there is
little or no marital property. 84
82 I1l. Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 503(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
83 For an example of such a provision in "separate/marital" property states, see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (1981). S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §.25-4-44
(1976) provides an example of a similar "catch-all" provision in an "all property"
state ("Court shall have regard for equity and the circumstances of the parties" in
making property division.).
84 At least one court has recognized the limitations of remedies that do not
themselves recharacterize property as marital, but rather merely allow certain factors
to be considered in dividing marital property. Drennan v. Drennan, 93 Il1. App. 3d
903, 418 N.E.2d 30 (App. Ct. 1981). In Drennan, there was no substantial marital
property with which to compensate the wife for contributions she made during the
marriage to reduce the mortgage on a home acquired by her husband prior to
marriage. Although the Illinois property division statutue directed divorce courts to
consider contributions by a party to both marital and nonmarital property as relevant
factors in dividing property, the statute permitted division of only marital property.
Recognizing the limitations on the use of this factor when there was little or no marital
property, the Appellate Court of Illinois endorsed several other methods of compen-
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One method of giving courts in "separate/marital" property states the
power to divide property acquired during premarital cohabitation might be
through judicial expansion of the definition of divisible property to include
property acquired by the parties during the period of premarital cohabita-
tion. Several courts have refused to so expand the definition. 85 However,
courts in both Illinois and Colorado have expanded the definition of marital
property to include certain pieces of property acquired by one of the spouses
prior to marriage if the property is acquired in contemplation of marriage.
These decisions may serve as a basis for providing a remedy to divorcing
spouses seeking recognition of the premarital period for purposes of prop-
erty division.
In In re Marriage of Altman,8 6 for example, the husband purchased a
home several days prior to and in contemplation of marriage. The parties
jointly selected the home, financed it through the husband's GI Bill privi-
leges, and resided there during the marriage. Most of the equity acquired in it
during the marriage resulted from joint contributions of the parties. Even
though the home was acquired prior to marriage, the Colorado Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's classification of it as marital property. The
court expanded the literal meaning of the Colorado property division statute
stating that "[in order to obtain the status of separate property under
. .. [the statute], it must appear that the property was acquired prior to
marriage with the intent that it become the separate property of Husband. A
contrary intent appears from the record before us."
87
Citing the Altman decision, the Appellate Court of Illinois, in Stallings v.
Stallings,8 8 also expanded the statutory definition of marital property to
include certain property acquired prior to marriage. In Stallings, the couple
purchased their home as tenants in common less than two months before
sating the wife for her contribution. The court suggested a lump sum award related to
the wife's contribution to the nonmarital assets, or a charge or lien against the
nonmarital property in the amount of her contribution.
Although these options do not technically reclassify nonmarital property as marital
property, they do result in the distribution of nonmarital property to the spouse not
holding title. However, courts may not be willing to extend Drennan beyond its facts.
In Drennan, the wife's contribution was made during the marriage and it was mone-
tary. Spouses whose contribution to nonmarital property took place during premari-
tal cohabitation or whose contribution was nonmonetary could be without remedy.
The extent of compensation for contributions to nonmarital property is also unclear
both under the Illinois statutory provision discussed in the text and under Drennan.
Courts may limit compensation to the actual dollar amount of the contribution. On
the other hand, courts may include property appreciation in proportion to the extent
of the spouse's contribution.
85 In re Marriage of Crouch, 88 Ill. App. 3d 426, 430, 410 N.E.2d 580, 582 (App. Ct.
1980); Grishman v. Grishman, 407 A.2d 9, 11-12 (Me. 1979).
86 35 Colo. App. 183, 530 P.2d 1012 (Ct. App. 1974).
87 Id. at 184, 530 P.2d at 1013.
88 75 Ill. App. 3d 96, 393 N.E.2d 1065 (App. Ct. 1979).
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their marriage. The wife furnished the down payment and made mortgage
payments during the marriage from her salary. Rather than holding that each
spouse's interest in the property as tenant in common was that spouse's
separate property since acquired before marriage, the trial court charac-
terized the property as marital and awarded the entire home to the wife. 89
The appellate court upheld classification of the home as marital property,
stating:
Our new Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act does not arbitrarily
categorize all property acquired prior to marriage as nonmarital prop-
erty. Rather, Section 503, we believe, is intended to protect such prop-
erty as may have been purchased by one spouse prior to marriage
entirely with his or her own funds. 90
In In re Marriage of Schriner, 91 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the
Stallings holding was applicable even when the husband paid the entire price
of the property before marriage, if it were shown that the property was not
purchased for the husband's sole use. By emphasizing intent to keep prop-
erty separate, the Appellate Court of Illinois, as did the Colorado Court of
Appeals, went beyond the literal definitions of marital and separate property
set forth in their property division statutes. 92
Although the theories espoused in Altman and Stallings arguably may
serve as a vehicle enabling litigants to characterize property acquired during
89 By characterizing the property as marital, the court could then include it in the
property to be divided between the parties upon the dissolution of the marriage. If the
property had been characterized as separate, the court would have been constrained
to assign it to the husband, despite the fact that it was used jointly by the parties
during their marriage and that marital funds were used in the accrual of equity in the
property.
90 75 11. App. 3d at 99, 393 N.E.2d at 1067.
91 88 Ill. App. 3d 380, 383-84, 410 N.E.2d 572, 574-75 (App. Ct. 1980).
92 The Illinois statute, for example, provides as follows:
§ 503. Disposition of property
(a) For purposes of this Act, "marital property" means all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following, which is known
as "non-marital property":
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or
in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) any judgment or property obtained by judgment awarded to a spouse from
the other spouse;
(6) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage; and
(7) property acquired before the marriage.
Ill. Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
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the period of premarital cohabitation as marital property, 93 courts may be
unwilling to extend the holdings in those cases to include this situation.
Several factors may be sufficient to distinguish property acquired during a
period of premarital cohabitation from property acquired in contemplation of
marriage, even if the cohabiting parties did plan on eventually marrying. 94
Unlike property acquired in contemplation of marriage, parties use property
acquired during premarital cohabitation prior to the marriage. In addition,
the purchase may have occurred months or even years prior to the actual
marriage.
If courts are willing to ignore these distinctions, however, parties could
argue that the Altman-Stallings holdings apply even if the parties did not
contemplate marriage when they began cohabiting. The "contemplation of
marriage" criterion discussed in Altman and Stallings can be viewed as
merely one method for ascertaining whether the parties intended to share the
property during marriage. When parties cohabit before marriage, a court
93 These cases clearly represent an expansion of the statutory definitions of marital
and separate property and not merely a clarification of ambiguous terms. Especially
in the Schriner case, in which the property in question was entirely paid for by the
husband prior to the marriage, the court's finding that the property was marital
property represents a clear extension of the concept of marital property and a
concomitant contraction of the concept of separate property. If the court intended
only to characterize the property as marital because it was used jointly by the parties,
the court could have used the doctrine of transmutation. See infra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text. Under that doctrine the property originally would have been
characterized as separate property but at some later point would have been trans-
muted into marital property. The language in the Colorado and Illinois decisions,
however, indicates that the property in question was marital property from the
moment it was acquired. The courts emphasized the intent of the purchaser prior to
rather than during the marriage to share the property.
94 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. In a recent decision involving a
premarital cohabitation claim, the Illinois Court of Appeals did not apply Stallings. In
re Marriage of Reeser, 97 Ill. App. 3d 838, 424 N.E.2d 45 (App. Ct. 1981). The court
did not specifically base its holding on the cohabitation, but rather on the failure of
the claimant to prove that the property, a home, was purchased in contemplation of
marriage. It indicated that evidence regarding the premarital cohabitation period
might have been relevant in determining whether the property should be classified as
marital, but it left unclear exactly what impact that evidence would have on its
decision:
In the instant case the facts do not support the finding that the home was
purchased in contemplation of marriage. Title to the property, when purchased,
was placed in the husband's name only, and although the wife testified that she
stayed in the home prior to marriage, there is no basis for a finding that the
parties contemplated marriage at the time of the purchase. There was no tes-
timony with regard to when the parties became engaged, nor where the husband
lived prior to purchasing the home. Neither does the record reveal how long the
parties knew each other prior to their marriage or cohabitation.
Id. at 840, 424 N.E.2d at 47.
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could examine the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the property
as well as how the parties used the property during the period of cohabitation
for evidence of intent that the property be shared.
B. Transmutation
Another doctrine used in "separate/marital" property states to give rec-
ognition to the period of premarital cohabitation in a divorce action is
transmutation. This judicially-created doctrine is another example of courts'
willingness to go beyond the basic strictures of the statutory classifications
of separate and marital property when those strictures would lead to inequi-
table results. According to the doctrine of transmutation, property that origi-
nally was classified as separate property can be transmuted into marital
property when the spouse with title represents to the other spouse that the
property will be shared. 95
Transmutation may occur by agreement, either express or implied. Courts
have applied the doctrine of transmutation by agreement not only when
representations regarding intent to share the property were made during the
marriage, but also when representations were made shortly before the mar-
riage. 96 Transmutation also has been found when representations were made
in the same vague language 97 as allegations of oral contracts between non-
marital cohabitants. 98 Thus, when a party represents that property acquired
during the premarital period will be shared, those representations might
serve as the basis for an argument that the nonmarital property was trans-
muted into marital property, rather than as the basis for only an independent
9' See, e.g., Faust v. Faust, 91 Cal. App. 2d 304, 308, 204 P.2d 906, 908 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1949); Stice v. Stice, 81 Cal. App. 2d. 792, 797-98, 185 P.2d 402, 406 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1947); Daniels v. Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
Transmutation also may occur in some jurisdictions through the commingling of
separate property with marital property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 86 I11. 2d
518, 529, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (1981) (if spouse holding nonmarital property
commingles it with either marital property or nonmarital property of the other
spouse, the commingled property is presumed to be marital property). Divorcing
spouses who have lived together before marriage and who have commingled property
or funds acquired during premarital cohabitation with property or funds acquired
subsequent to the marriage could take advantage of this theory.
96 See, e.g., Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal. 134, 30 P.2d 398 (1934) (oral agreement
before marriage that property each owned was to become community property
suffices to transmute the separate property into community property). Although this
case involved the characterization of property as either separate or community
property, the concepts are similar to those used in common law jurisdictions to
characterize separate and marital property.
97 See, e.g., In re Sill's Estate, 121 Cal. App. 202, 204, 9 P.2d 243, 244 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1932), in which the transmutation was based upon the husband's statement to
his wife that "it is just as much yours as it will be mine; this is our home."
98 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
1983] PREMARITAL COHABITATION AND DIVORCE 131
contractual claim. 99 Transmutation by agreement also may be implied
through the actions of the parties with respect to the property. 100 When
parties have lived together before marriage, their joint use and control over
property both during cohabitation and then during marriage might support a
claim of transmutation through implied agreement.
C. Limitations of the Judicial Alternatives
Each of the above-described methods for judicial recognition of the pre-
marital period in the context of divorce proceedings has certain limitations.
Interpretation of existing statutory language to take into account the premar-
ital cohabitation period in determining how the property is to be divided
may be useful in "all property" states. In contrast, this remedy is less
effective in "separate/marital" property states if there is little or no marital
property for the courts to divide. Cases expanding the definition of divisible
"marital" property to include property acquired shortly before marriage
have thus far been limited to situations involving contemplation of marriage
at the time the property was purchased and have not included the additional
factor of premarital cohabitation. Without guidance from the legislature,
courts may be unwilling to so broadly extend existing statutory language.
The judicial alternatives avoid the procedural problems involved in bring-
ing a separate action. However, to the extent that classification of property
as marital depends upon intent, problems of proof arise similar to those
discussed in relation to intent-based remedies. 10 1 Moreover, remedies based
on transmutation and judicial interpretation focus primarily on particular
pieces of property rather than on the more general economic relationship
between premarital cohabitants. The limitations of these remedies derive
from the fact that none of them were created to deal specifically with
recognizing the period of premarital cohabitation at divorce. Thus, they are
not the product of a considered attempt to provide an adequate remedy.
V. LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF THE PREMARITAL PERIOD
A. The Proposal
In contrast to judicial recognition of the premarital period, legislation can
directly respond to the problems associated with the current approach of the
courts and with the judicial alternatives. In "separate/marital" property
99 By utilizing the doctrine of transmutation as a means of arguing that property
acquired during the premarital period should be divisible, divorcing spouses can
eliminate many of the procedural problems involved in bringing an independent
action. Proving an express or implied agreement to share, however, involves some of
the same proof problems discussed in conjunction with intent-based theories. See
supra note 53-55 and accompanying text.
100 See Daniels v. Daniels, 624 Mo. 872, 557 S.W.2d 702 (1977).
101 See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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states, for example, legislation could expand the definition of divisible prop-
erty.
This Article proposes that divorce statutes in "separate/marital" property
states be amended to draw their basic distinctions between divisible and
separate (or nondivisible) property rather than between marital and nonmar-
ital property. 10 Divisible property should include both marital property as it
is presently defined in statutes and premarital property. Premarital property
should be comprised of two specific types of property: (1) property acquired
by either party "in contemplation of marriage" with the intent that the
parties use the property jointly during marriage;'0 3 and (2) property acquired
by either party during a period of premarital cohabitation.
Courts in all states should distribute the divisible property in accordance
with the same factors that the state presently prescribes for marital property
with one important difference. This Article also proposes that legislation
modify factors that look to actions of the parties during marriage by extend-
ing the relevant time period to include the period of premarital cohabita-
tion. 10 4 For example, when a statute directs the court to consider the dura-
tion of the marriage in dividing the property, 105 the amended statute should
direct the court to consider the duration of the period of cohabitation and
marriage combined. Likewise, when the contributions of a spouse as
homemaker are to be considered, 0 6 legislation should make clear that
homemaker services during the period of premarital cohabitation be consid-
ered as well.
The amended statutes in all states should provide that, unless the parties
made an express contract prior to marriage regarding the disposition of
premarital property, the statutory remedies are exclusive and in lieu of any
other remedies that the jurisdiction extends to nonmarital cohabitants. The
exception for express contracts permits some variance from the statutory
scheme; however, express contracts should be enforced only if two condi-
102 The term "nondivisible" should be avoided if the jurisdiction allows separate
property to be invaded.
103 This subsection of the statutory proposal codifies the concept already recog-
nized judicially in Colorado and Illinois. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying
text.
104 In "title states," attempts to mitigate the harshness of the "title" rule are most
often accomplished judicially because of a reluctance on the part of the legislature to
abandon the statutory scheme. Therefore, until the legislatures decide to effect a
more sweeping revision of their property division statutes, legislative action in these
states is unlikely.
105 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-51 (West 1978); I11. Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(d)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (1)(c) (Supp. 1982).
106 See, e.g., I11. Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, § 503(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190(1)(a) (Supp.
1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(l)(A) (1981).
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tions are met: (1) the agreement complies with all the formalities 10 7 and
substantive requirements' 08 that the jurisdiction imposes upon antenuptial
agreements; and (2) the agreement addresses specifically the disposition of
property upon dissolution of marriage.
The exception to the exclusive statutory remedies is consonant with the
trend toward allowing parties to vary by contract certain statutorily-imposed
incidents of marriage. 10 9 Such agreements must meet strict standards" to
ensure fairness. In addition to the content and formality of execution re-
quirements imposed on antenuptial agreements in general, the requirement
that the agreement specifically address the disposition of premarital property
upon the dissolution of marriage ensures that the parties intended the agree-
ment to regulate their property ownership and division even if they married.
B. In Support of the Proposed Solution
Despite the changing attitude of American society toward nonmarital
cohabitation, it is not yet fully accepted as a social institution."' Therefore,
107 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-201(B) (1976) (antenuptial contract
must be acknowledged by an officer authorized to acknowledge deeds); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 301 (1981) (two witnesses and execution ten days before marriage
required for valid antenuptial contract). The Statute of Frauds in most states requires
promises in consideration of marriage to be in writing. See generally H. CLARK, supra
note 77, at § 1.9 (discussing antenuptial agreements).
108 Because of the relationship of trust between the parties to an antenuptial
agreement, courts and legislatures have imposed stringent requirements to ensure
that antenuptial agreements are made with full knowledge of the circumstances. See,
e.g., Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 452 P.2d 560 (1969) (prenuptial agreement held
invalid where wealthy and educated husband did not explain to wife, who had high
school education and little means, the extent to which she was surrendering her rights
in signing the agreement); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-606 (Supp. 1982) (antenuptial
agreements enforceable only if court determines that parties entered into agreement
knowingly and freely and without undue influence or duress).
109 See Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 531 P.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1975)
(statute rendering certain after-acquired property community property does not
preclude a valid antenuptial agreement); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (if not unconscionable, an antenuptial agreement is neither contrary to
public policy nor precluded by the Missouri Dissolution of Marriage Act).
110 See supra notes 107-08.
" Trost, in his book Unmarried Cohabitation, describes three stages in the
development of a country's views on nonmarital cohabitation. Nonmarital cohabita-
tion is first regarded as a deviant phenomenon; the country then goes through a
period of change and acceptance; and lastly, the lifestyle becomes an accepted social
institution. J. TROST, supra note 7, at 186. Trost concludes that as of 1979, the date of
publication, much of the United States still seemed to regard nonmarital cohabitation
as deviant although some parts of North American culture had progressed to the
period of change and acceptance. Id. at 187.
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a proposal to institutionalize this lifestyle through legislative recognition in
divorce proceedings is certain to be controversial.
Proposals to recognize rights arising from periods of nonmarital cohabita-
tion often are criticized as discouraging marriage by blurring the distinction
between cohabitation and marriage. 112 To the extent that the deterrence of
marriage argument has any validity, 11 3 it has little application to the legisla-
112 Of substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is
the impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage.
Will the fact that legal rights closely resembling those arising from conventional
marriages can be acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter into what
have heretofore been commonly referred to as "illicit" or "meretricious" rela-
tionships encourage formation of such relationships and weaken marriage as the
foundation of our family-based society?
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 11. 2d 49, 58, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1979).
Even the California Supreme Court in Marvin, while extending a variety of reme-
dies to nonmarital cohabitants, reaffirmed the centrality of marriage to the welfare of
American society:
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabita-
tion that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that
have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many. Lest we be misun-
derstood, however, we take this occasion to point out that the structure of
society itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we
have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution. The
joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive
and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a
lifetime.
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831
(1976).
113 The "deterrence of marriage" argument is based upon certain questionable
assumptions about the role that government can and should play in shaping people's
moral behavior. The current trend in the area of state regulation of family relation-
ships is toward less regulation of the formalities of entering or exiting a relationship
and toward more regulation of its consequences, i.e., economic and child-related
matters. See Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62
VA. L. REv. 663, 665-66 (1976). This deregulation of formalities may reflect recogni-
tion of the fact that some areas of behavior are law-resistant and not responsive to
coercive pressure applied through the law. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND
THE NEW PROPERTY 127 (1981).
Arguably, proponents of the deterrence of marriage argument are erroneously
framing the issue in terms of couples affirmatively selecting between marriage and
cohabitation. Empirical data from a Swedish study indicates that "it is very seldom
that a couple moves in together 'without marrying.' What they do is simply move in
together. There is rarely an evident decision not to marry... (nor) very often even a
decision to move together. It just happens to turn out that way." J. TROST, supra note
7, at 79.
In fact, this study suggests that the comparative legal and economic incidents of
marriage and nonmarital cohabitation are not substantial factors in a couple's deci-
sion to cohabit rather than to marry. In a question specifically designed to require
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tive proposal presented in this Article. The rights deriving from this proposal
are extended only to those cohabitants who have married. Rather than
discouraging marriage, then, the legislative proposal arguably encourages
marriage by increasing the rights flowing from the nonmarital period. Nor
does this proposal extend to nonmarital cohabitants all of the statutory rights
usually associated with marriage such as alimony or inheritance rights. 11 4
Rather, this legislative proposal would merely modify divorce statutes to
respond directly to the special problems encountered by premarital cohabi-
tants at divorce.
Proposals to extend property rights to nonmarital cohabitants also have
been criticized as an imposition upon the freedom of parties to engage in
alternative lifestyles that are attractive because they have no legal implica-
tions. 115 The legislative proposal, however, does allow such parties to con-
tract out of the legislative scheme. In addition, studies suggest that the
legislative proposal probably is consonant with and responsive to the expec-
tations of cohabitants. The authors of one study, for example, directed
university students to write a contract either for a relationship in which they
were involved or for and with another couple. 1 6 The contracts indicated an
couples to think about the impact of legal and economic incidents upon a decision to
marry, Trost asked 101 newly-married couples who had cohabited prior to marriage
whether they would have married if the law were changed so that cohabitation
without marriage were in all respects equated with marriage. Only 12% of the men and
13% of the women answered no. J. TROsT, supra note 7, at 81-82. Most respondents
answered that they would have married anyway because of tradition, ethics ("mar-
riage is the only right thing"), or other factors unassociated with the economic or
legal relationship between the parties. Id. Trost asked the same question to 111
couples presently living together. Fifty-nine percent of the men and 57% of the
women responded that they would not marry if marriage and cohabitation were equal
at law. Id. Thus, the difference in legal treatment does not seem to be what is
attracting cohabitants to choose that lifestyle.
Although the Trost study is extensively cited, e.g., Blumberg, Cohabitation With-
out Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1125, 1130 (1981), the
conclusions that can be drawn from it are limited by the fact that it is a Swedish study.
Swedish society arguably differs from American society in the way cohabiting
couples perceive their relationship. The Trost study, however, remains the most
complete study of cohabitation available. In the United States, most empirical re-
search regarding cohabitation, such as the Weitzman study, discussed infra notes
116-17, focuses upon college students.
114 The legislative proposal merely increases the effect of a marriage in much the
same way as the subsequent marriage of a child's parents makes the child legitimate.
See H. CLARK, supra note 77, at 158 n.4.
" Clark, supra note 1, at 451-52; cf. Weyrauch, Metamorphosis of Marriage, 13
FAM. L.Q. 415, 425-26 (1980) (referring to the fact that property and contract law are
being applied to persons who specifically did not enter into marriage contracts as
"paradoxical and practical").
116 Weitzman, Dixon, Bird, McGinn & Robertson, Contracts for Intimate Rela-
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overwhelming preference for sharing property acquired during the relation-
ship.117 A Swedish study of 101 newly-married couples who had previously
cohabited and 111 couples cohabiting at the time of the study also supports
this hypothesis in that more than eighty percent of the participants felt there
was no difference between cohabitation and marriage. 118
The proposed legislative changes should eliminate many of the problems
involved in relegating divorcing spouses to the time and expense of pursuing
separate actions. Nonmarital cohabitation remedies are ill-designed to cope
with the problems of premarital cohabitants." 9 The legislative proposal not
only eliminates the proof problems of the intent-based theories and of the
judicial alternatives discussed in this Article, but it also eliminates the
tionships: A Study of Contracts Before, Within and in Lieu of Legal Marriage, 1
ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 303 (1978).
The students involved in this study were enrolled in an upper level sociology
course on sex roles in the law. Fifty-nine contracts were submitted, 22% of which
were contracts within marriage, 24% between couples who planned to marry but
wanted to live together first, and 47% between couples choosing cohabitation as an
alternative to marriage. Id. at 332-33.
117 Seventy-six percent of those choosing cohabitation as an alternative to mar-
riage designated all post-contract assets as community property, and 100% of those
who planned to marry but wanted to live together first chose the community property
option. Id.
As with the Trost study, see supra note 113, the conclusions that can be drawn from
this study are limited by the sample of the population upon which the study is based.
The middle-class college student comprising the Weitzman study may not be rep-
resentative of the majority of couples cohabiting in this country.
1ll More than 80% of the participants defined the term "cohabitation without
marriage" as either "like being married," "married indirectly," or "about the same
as being married." J. TROST, supra note 7, at 20. In fact, more than 90% of those
cohabiting at the time of the study responded that they looked upon their relationship
as fully comparable to marriage. Id. at 21. Despite the feelings of the participants that
there was no difference between cohabitation and marriage, the law in Sweden does
draw distinctions in the treatment of those two groups. Id. at 139-53. Consequently,
Trost concludes that the feeling of comparability "has more of a normative character
and thus says more about how the respondents feel that it should be than how it de
facto is." Id. at 160.
119 Some commentators have noted the theoretical possibility that recovery for
nonmarital cohabitants under remedies such as quantum meruit or implied-in-fact
partnerships may be greater ihan that afforded to spouses upon divorce. Blumberg,
supra note 113, at 1165; Bruch, supra note 64, at 130-31. This potential result may
lead to objections to the exclusivity of the proposed statutory remedy. The theoreti-
cal discrepancy in potential recovery should be discounted, however, by the difficul-
ties of proving the causes of action necessary to obtain recovery under existing
theories. See supra notes 53-80 and accompanying text. The statutory remedy would
automatically bring property acquired during the period of premarital cohabitation
into the pot of divisible property. Thus the likelihood of some recovery would be far
greater under the statutory scheme than under presently available remedies.
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waiver, superseding contract, and modification of contract concerns posed
by nonmarital cohabitation remedies. In addition, explicit recognition in the
legislative proposal of the premarital period as related to and yet distinct
from the period of the marriage lessens the likelihood that a court will
determine that the advantages acquired by a spouse during the marriage
negate any claims relating to the premarital period.1 20
By broadening the definition of divisible property to include property
acquired during premarital cohabitation, legislatures will be giving the courts
more resources from which to fashion an equitable separation of the parties'
economic partnership. Moreover, by utilizing the broad discretion they have
in fashioning the actual division of property, courts will retain their ability to
survey the equities and to examine the contribution that each party made to
the acquisition of the property' 2 ' in fashioning the actual award.
VI. CONCLUSION
Increasingly, divorce courts are being faced with the task of fashioning
property division awards for divorcing spouses whose economic relationship
began during a period of premarital cohabitation. Courts have responded by
basing relief on the remedies available to nonmarital cohabitants without
first evaluating the problems that arise when those remedies are utilized in
the context of a divorce proceeding.
Although broad judicial interpretation of existing divorce statutes may
provide partial relief to divorcing spouses as an alternative to pursuing
remedies designed for nonmarital cohabitants, a more. direct response
through amendment of divorce statutes would provide a more comprehen-
sive scheme. The legislative scheme proposed in this Article calls for expan-
sion of the categories of divisible property to include property acquired
during premarital cohabitation and for similar expansion of the relevant time
period that courts are directed to consider in determining how the property
should be divided. In addition to eliminating the substantive and procedural
problems caused by relegating a divorcing spouse to remedies designed for
nonmarital cohabitants, this proposal furthers the policy of judicial econ-
omy. Moreover, it enables the court to fulfill its responsibility to provide an
equitable separation of the divorcing parties' lives in a manner that enables
them to function as independent members of society.
120 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
121 Most disposition of property statutes specifically direct the court to "equita-
bly" divide the property and and to consider "all relevant factors" in doing so. See,
e.g., supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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